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PUTTING HEGEMONY IN ITS PLACE1
It  is  a  genuine pleasure  to  respond  to  Jonathan Joseph’s  restatement and
refinement of  his  account of  hegemony as a  necessary feature of  societal
organization with both enduring structural  and emergent strategic  aspects.
Our earlier discussions on this topic and the present written exchange have
been conducted in the collegial spirit  necessary to advance critical  realism
and  examine  its  relevance  to  hegemony.  We  share  a  methodological
commitment to critical  realism and enough common substantive ground to
attempt to move the dialogue forward from my earlier critique.2 Joseph has
chosen to respond to this by restating his account of hegemony; in turn, my
response will elaborate my own strategic-relational approach (SRA) and its
relation to form analysis. I hope thereby to deal with two key issues set out in
his response: (a) the nature and limits of functional explanation and (b) the
nature and limits of the SRA characteristic of Poulantzas’s work as well as
mine. But we should first see what is at stake by considering the problematic
unity  of  the  social  totality  and  the  extent  to  which  form  problematizes
function.
TOTALITIES AND TOTALIZATION
The first major difference between our respective approaches concerns the
issue of hegemony being ‘fundamental to the unity of all modern societies’.3
Joseph assumes both that a fundamental societal unity is normal and that it
can  and  must  be  secured  through  a  distinctive  structural  hegemony that
creates the conditions for the renewal of hegemonic practices concerned to
secure  this  unity. I  incline  to  the  opposite  assumption, treating  structural
integration and social cohesion as deeply problematic and the constitution of
bounded  and  unified  societies  as  inherently  improbable.  Thus,  whereas
Joseph  tends  to  take  structural  totalities  for  granted  and  regards  their
breakdown as recuperable through new hegemonic practices facilitated by an
underlying  structural  hegemony,  I  question  the  feasibility  of  totalization
practices and argue that they can succeed only relatively, precariously, and
1 This response has benefited from earlier discussions with Jonathan Joseph, which
helped  clear  up  some  possible  misunderstandings  in  my initial  critique,  ‘Critical
realism and hegemony’, Journal of Critical Realism, vol. 1, no 2, 2003, 183–94. The
present commentary is a response to his response, not a defence of the earlier critique.
2 Jessop, ‘Critical realism and hegemony’.
3 J. Joseph, ‘Restating hegemonic theory’, Journal of Critical Realism, vol. 2, no. 1,
2003, p. 128.
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temporarily  within  specific  socially  constituted  spatio-temporal  fixes  that
displace  and  defer  many contradictions,  crisis-tendencies, and conflicts to
marginalized places and spaces within and beyond the boundaries of this fix
and/or into the future. 
Nonetheless, despite  these radically opposed starting points,  there is  some
scope for a reciprocal convergence. For Joseph concedes the mediating role
of  conjunctural  social  practices  in  reproducing  the  fundamental  unity  of
modern  society;  and  my  own  analyses  allow  for  the  embedding  of  a
recursively reproduced strategic selectivity deep within social formations so
that actions oriented to social  reproduction tend to be reinforced and non-
reproductive practices  are neutralized or  subverted. Where we continue to
differ is over the respective ‘generative mechanisms’ that he and I retroduce
to explain these tendencies. Thus, whereas Joseph retroduces the necessity of
a  deep-rooted  and  untransparent  structural  hegemony  to  explain  the
fundamental unity of society, I regard this less as an explanation than as a
restatement  or  redescription  of  the  problem  to  be  explained.  Structural
hegemony  would  only  acquire  explanatory  force  when  specific  causal
mechanisms  are  identified  that  can  account  for  its  functionality  and/or
effectivity. In his response to my earlier statement of this critique, Joseph now
argues that the generative mechanisms through which structural hegemony
operates are the actually existing strategic projects that organize the complex
of social relations (e.g., state strategies, historical blocs, modes of regulation
and so  on).4 This  seems to  equate  these strategic  projects  with structural
hegemony, not to explain the former in terms of the latter (but see below on
Joseph’s account of the transformational model of social agency). 
In  contrast,  I  retroduce  the  necessity  of  an  effective  social  imaginary to
constitute subsets of social relations as the focus of competing and limited
societalization  (totalizing)  projects  within  a  specific  spatio-temporal  fix
organized around specific social,  material, and spatio-temporal horizons of
action. Joseph would probably interpret this as a form of residual voluntarism
unless  the  effectiveness  of  the  relevant  projects  can  be  related  to  the
materiality of the social relations that these projects seek to transform. And,
indeed,  I  try to  avoid this  charge in  two ways. First,  by arguing that  the
objects of given societalization projects both pre-exist these projects and are
constituted in and through them. The necessary incompleteness of society as a
total system implies that social relations exist as relatively underdetermined
‘elements’ but,  once subject  to  effective societalization  projects,  they are
transformed  into  so  many  ‘moments’  within  a  mode  of  societalization
characterized by a relative ‘structured coherence’. There are many economic
and political  imaginaries competing for hegemony or,  at  least, a dominant
position in contemporary society. Thus, insofar as the same elements can be
articulated into alternative modes of societalization, they can never be fully
4 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 130.
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fixed within any one mode of societalization. It follows that societalization is
always partial  and unstable and  the balance between fixity and fluidity is
complex and changing. We must explain how societalization projects and
procedures  emerge,  interact,  and  combine  to  produce  particular  social
formations and societies rather than others and, once produced, how they are
vulnerable to the basic contradictions, crisis-tendencies, and conflicts inherent
in  capitalism  and  to  struggles  for  the  dominance  or  hegemony of  other
societalization projects.  Second, I try to avoid voluntarism by emphasizing
that it is unlikely that the state (or any other institution or agency) could ever
know in advance how to solve economic, political, and social problems even
were  such  total  solutions  possible.  Its  interventions  require  active
management of  changing conjunctures  within an  inherently  contradictory
system rather than pursuit of predetermined and autonomous economic and
social policies. They are always mediated in and through political struggles
broadly  defined rather  than determined in  narrow technical  and economic
terms.5 And they are affected by the state’s own distinctive failures and crisis-
tendencies, rooted in the distinctive nature of politics in capitalist societies. In
this second respect  there is much common ground between our respective
theoretical positions.
STRUCTURAL HEGEMONY AND HEGEMONIC PROJECTS
The  nature of  our  differences regarding the fundamental unity of  modern
societies  can  be  illuminated  by  considering  Joseph’s  initial  reliance  on
Bhaskar’s ‘very general’ transformational model of  social  action (TMSA).
This  claims that  structures  are  both  the  necessary condition  for  and  the
reproduced outcome of social activity. Joseph glosses Bhaskar’s account by
insisting that it is not a series of isolated and pure actions that reproduce a
pure  and  unified social  structure  (or  get  restrained  in  turn  by the  latter).
Instead he emphasizes the mediation of social reproduction through multiple,
overlapping, and interacting sets  of  collectively organized social  practices
that affect and unify a multitude of different social structures. The tendency
for this complex structural ensemble to persist quasi-inertially (and hence its
qualities as a conatus, to repeat Joseph’s use of Spinoza’s term) is precisely
what encourages  Joseph  to  retroduce  structural  hegemony to  explain  this
structural  persistence.  Thus  he  takes  the  TMSA  to  mean  that  structural
hegemony is the necessary condition for fundamental unity and is reproduced
through the mediation of contingent hegemonic projects (broadly interpreted)
in and through which this same structural determination is reproduced.
The strategic-relational approach posits a dialectic linking structure and agency
that is more complex than that in the TMSA. Bhaskar treats structure  as an
emergent  effect  of  action,  and  agency  as  a  structurally  constrained  and
enabled mode of action. In this sense, structures are prior to social actions




and their outcome too. The TMSA tends to retain the familiar dualism of
structure and agency because, at any given point in the analysis, it brackets
one or other aspect of the resulting duality. The SRA rests on a more radical
‘methodological  relationalism’.  It  highlights  the  tendency  for  specific
structures and structural configurations to selectively reinforce specific forms
of  action,  tactics,  or  strategies  and  to  discourage  others  (on  strategic
selectivity, see below). It also emphasizes the possibility of reflection on the
part  of  individual  and  collective  actors  about  the  strategic  selectivities
inscribed within structures so that they come to orient their strategies and
tactics in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture and their
‘feel for the game’. This can (but need not) extend to self-reflection about the
identities and interests that orient their strategies. It follows that the scope for
the  reflexive  reorganization  of  structural  configurations  is  subject  to
structurally-inscribed strategic  selectivity  (and  thus  has  path-dependent  as
well as path-shaping aspects); and that the recursive selection of strategies
and  tactics  depends  on  individual,  collective,  or  organizational  learning
capacities  and on the ‘experiences’ resulting from the pursuit of  different
strategies  and  tactics  in  different  conjunctures.  Moreover,  insofar  as
reflexively  reorganized  structural  configurations  and  recursively  selected
strategies and tactics co-evolve to produce a relatively stable order out of a
potentially unstructured complexity, we can talk of the structured coherence
of this co-evolving, self-organizing order. This can be understood in terms of
the continuing interaction between the reflexive reorganization of strategic
selectivities  and  the  recursive  selection  and  retention  (or  evolutionary
stabilization) of specific strategies and tactics oriented to those selectivities.6 I
suggest that this is the answer to Joseph’s implied criticism of my approach
that  ‘there  is  something  beyond  strategic  relations—socio-structural
conditions and the reproduction of structural ensembles. We have to move
from the strategic-relational  level  of  institutional  ensembles to  the deeper
level of structural ensembles if we are to make sense of formal adequacy’.7
I suggest that what Joseph terms structural hegemony can be re-interpreted as
structural coherence and linked in turn to hegemonic practices in the above
manner.  For  Joseph  distinguishes  two  types  of  hegemony: (1)  structural
hegemony concerns the underlying or deep-rooted conditions within society
and the unity of the social formation; and (2) strategic hegemony in a more
conscious,  political  sense  concerned  with  concrete  hegemonic  projects  and
practices. He further suggests that, although concrete hegemonic practices are
grounded  in  structural  hegemony,  their  content  is  not  pre-scripted,  their
emergence is not pre-destined, and their relative success is not pre-determined.
Concrete hegemonic practices are always contingent and irreducibly shaped by
the terrain of political struggles. Thus, to study hegemony in its strategic sense,
we  must  examine  different  social  projects,  the  particular  social  groups  and
6 For  further  discussion,  see  B.  Jessop,  ‘Institutional  (re-)turns  and  the  strategic-
relational approach’, Environment and Planning A , vol. 33, no. 7, 2001, 1213–37.
7 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 132.
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classes involved, the interests that they represent, the various values and world-
views that they hold and the resulting political blocs and alliances.8 Joseph writes
that  structural  hegemony  and  hegemonic  strategies  can  (and  must)  be  re-
specified in concrete analyses to produce an adequate account of the various
macro-,  meso-, and micro-mechanisms and practices  that  produce  specific
cases  of  societal  stability and  social  order.  The  relative  success  of  these
different projects pursued on different scales and/or in specific sites is related
to  underlying  crisis-tendencies  and  crisis-effects  as  well  as  to  the  more
surface level conflicts and contradictions among actual social forces. ‘Thus
the task is to examine the overdetermination of many different factors and
how different generative mechanisms overlap and conflict with each other’.9 I
believe that we can get a clearer understanding of what all of this involves
here by adopting a strategic-relational approach.
A further dimension of  societalization neglected  by Joseph,  who tends to
naturalize societies and to treat their boundaries as coincident with those of
national states (Grossflachenstaaten), is the question of scale and integration.
This  is  where  the  concept  of  spatio-temporal  fix  is,  I  would  suggest,
particularly helpful. Spatio-temporal fixes have both strategic and structural
dimensions. Strategically, since the contradictions and dilemmas of capitalist
formations are insoluble in the abstract, they can only be resolved—partially
and  provisionally  at  best—through the  formulation-realization  of  specific
accumulation strategies in specific spatio-temporal contexts. These strategies
seek  to  resolve  conflicts  between  the  needs  of  ‘capital  in  general’  and
particular  capitals  by constructing  an  imagined ‘general interest’  that  will
necessarily  marginalize  some  capitalist  interests. Interests  are  not  only
relational but  also relative,  i.e.,  one has interests in relation to others and
relative to different spatial and temporal horizons. The general interest thus
delimits the identities and relations relative to which calculation of interests
occurs; and it confines the spatial and temporal horizons within which this
occurs. It involves specific notions about which identities and interests can be
synthesized within a general interest, about the intertemporal articulation of
different  time  horizons  (short-,  medium-,  and  long-term,  business  cycle,
electoral cycle, long wave, etc), and about the relative importance of different
spatial and/or scalar horizons (local,  regional, national, supranational, etc).
Thus a conception of the general interest privileges some identities, interests,
and spatio-temporal  horizons and marginalizes  or  sanctions others.  It  also
refers to what is needed to secure an institutionalized class compromise and
to address wider problems of social cohesion. Such success is often secured
only through a trial-and-error search that reveals the requirements of ‘capital
in  general’  more  through  repeated  failure  than  sustained  success.  In
establishing this general interest and institutionalized compromise, however,
accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects typically displace and defer
8 J. Joseph, Hegemony: A Realist Analysis (London and New York: Routledge, 2002),
p.128.
9 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 131.
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their  material  and  social  costs  beyond  the  social,  spatial,  and  temporal
boundaries  of  that  compromise.  This  can  involve  super-exploitation  of
internal  or  external  spaces  outside  the  compromise,  super-exploitation  of
nature or inherited social resources, deferral of problems into an indefinite
future, and, of course, the exploitation and/or oppression of specific classes or
other social categories. 
NON-FUNCTIONALIST FUNCTIONING 
AND FORMAL ADEQUACY
I  now  contrast  Joseph’s  claim  to  have  developed  a  non-functionalist
structural-functional  account  with  my  own  approach  in  terms  of  formal
adequacy  and  strategic  action.  Joseph  argues  that  his  position  cannot  be
functionalist because, in line with critical realism, it emphasizes the emergent
character of social relations within an open and stratified totality.10 Yet he
immediately adds  that  the social  system is  a  system, that  the totality is  a
totality,  and  that  we  need  to  know  how  each  part  fits  into  this  wider
framework.  It  is  the  assumption  of  totality  that  generates  functionalist
tendencies despite Joseph’s declared opposition to them. Thus, in response to
my earlier critique that his book provides no account of ‘how this miraculous,
improbable unification of a heterogeneous, contradictory, conflictual social
formation is achieved, it “just happens”’,11 Joseph responds that ‘it does kind
of “just happen” since, if it did not happen, the ensemble of social structures
and mechanisms would not be reproduced and a severe social crisis would
unfold’.12 We can clarify what is at stake here by distinguishing two forms of
functionalism.  A  teleological  functionalist  would  argue  that  structural
hegemony  and  hegemonic  practices  emerge  in  order  to satisfy  certain
functional needs of a pre-given society considered as a total system. An ex
post functionalist  would  argue  that  a  given society  considered  as  a  total
system will be consolidated only if an appropriate set of hegemonic practices
grounded  in  an  associated  and  underlying  structural  hegemony  can  be
discovered  and  consolidated  or  happens  to  evolve,  get  selected,  and  is
retained. It is this form of functionalism that is implied when Joseph argues
that ‘hegemony has a functional  role in relation to the unity of the social
formation so that if hegemony holds things together it succeeds and if it fails
a hegemonic crisis emerges’.13 But he also argues that, because the conditions
and requirements for hegemony do not go away, the failure of a hegemonic
project  will  lead  to  the  emergence  of  new  projects.  This  brings  him
dangerously  close  to  teleological  functionalism.  An  alternative,  non-
functionalist position is that capitalist social formations and bourgeois social
order do not pre-exist societalization. Instead, the spaces and scales on which
10 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 129.
11 Jessop, Future, p. 190.
12 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 132.
13 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 131.
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they exist, their temporal rhythms, their crisis-tendencies, and so on, in short,
their  basic  features  and  structural  forms,  are  the  product  of  attempts  to
envision, institute, and consolidate a more or less coherent and manageable
set of economic relations and their extra-economic conditions of existence.
This is the position that I  hold and there are also hints of this in Joseph’s
work. Thus he comes very close to this position when he writes:
if hegemony in its structural sense is concerned with ensuring the unity of the
social formation, how this emerges is not  given but is dependent on actual
hegemonic  projects  and  strategies  which  reflect  particular  interests.  Such
projects have their own irreducible dynamics. However, they do take place in
particular conditions and how successful they are does depend on how they
function in relation to underlying factors.14
My own approach replaces structural hegemony as a generative mechanism
with two concepts:  ‘formal adequacy’ and  ‘strategic selectivity’. The  first
concept is premised on form analysis, i.e.,  the study of forms as modes of
organizing social life. One can then consider specific social forms, the extent
to  which they are—or  could  ever  be—relatively unified in  a  given social
formation  (my  preferred  form-analytic  term  for  the  conventional,  but
ideologically imbued, and theoretically contested, category of ‘society’), and
the ways in which forms problematize function rather than guarantee it. In
this context formal adequacy exists to the extent that the forms that comprise
a  social  formation  are  mutually  compatible  and  thereby  help  to  sustain
specific  structures of  domination.  Marx  often  deploys this  concept  in  his
critique of political economy. For example, he argues that, whereas capital
can secure the formal (here, nominal) subsumption of labour-power under its
control in the manufacturing division of labour, it is machinofacture that is
formally adequate to the capitalist wage relation and thereby enables the real
subsumption of labour-power. Marx also notes that the modern representative
state  based  on  rational  bureaucracy  and  universal  suffrage  is  a  formally
adequate state form for capitalist social formations. Poulantzas builds on this
idea in distinguishing between the capitalist type of state (which is formally
adequate to capitalism) and states in capitalist societies (which are formally
inadequate  and  depend  far  more  on  force-fraud-corruption  and  political
improvisation than on the dull compulsion of political as well as economic
routinization)  to  secure  the  conditions  for  accumulation.  German  state
theorists  also  build  on  this  idea  in  distinguishing between  the  historical
constitution of the state in transitional periods and capitalist social formations
and  the  formal  constitution of  the  capitalist  state  as  one  that  is  formally
adequate to the structural coherence of a capitalist social formation. In both
cases, the capitalist type of state has a distinctive, form-determined strategic
selectivity with major implications for the organization and effectiveness of
state  intervention.  Broadening  the  argument,  we can  hypothesize that  the
14 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 132.
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more that  social  forms  in  different  domains  are  mutually supportive  and
reinforcing, the greater the underlying stability of a social  formation. It  is
possible  that  Joseph’s  use  of  Spinoza’s  notion  of  conatus  points  in  this
direction. For he argues that conatus allows us to conceive of the necessary
and  contingent  aspects  of  a  complex  structure  or  institution  in  a  non-
essentialist and non-functionalist way. But one must doubt this when he also
writes that ‘the unity of the state depends on whether it can “hang together”
and its “hanging together” depends upon whether it can do the kind of things
it has to do to survive in a capitalist environment, i.e. by its functioning in
relation  to  the  economy’.15 It  is  in  the  sense  sketched above  rather  than
Joseph’s notion of non-functionalist functioning that I analyse the Keynesian
Welfare National State as a formally adequate ideal type for Atlantic Fordism
whilst noting its  contradictions  and  its  inherent  limitations as  part  of  the
Atlantic Fordist spatio-temporal fix. Thus my approach differs in important
respects from the analytical strategy favoured by Joseph rather than being
consistent with it, as he claims.16 
More generally, inspired by Poulantzas, my form-analytic, strategic-relational
approach treats the state as a social relation. It can be defined as an ensemble
of  socially  embedded,  socially  regularized,  and  strategically  selective
institutions, organizations, social forces, and activities organized around (or
at  least  actively involved in) making collectively binding decisions for  an
imagined political community. A relational approach implies that the exercise
of  state  power  (or,  better,  state  powers  in  the  plural)  involves  a  form-
determined condensation of the changing balance of forces. In other words,
state power reflects the prevailing balance of forces as this is institutionally
mediated through the state apparatus with its structurally-inscribed strategic
selectivity. This refers to the ways in which the state qua social ensemble has
a  specific,  differential  impact  on  the  ability of  various political  forces  to
pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatio-temporal contexts
through their access to and/or control over given state capacities—capacities
that always depend for their effectiveness on links to forces and powers that
exist and operate beyond the state’s formal boundaries. It follows that to talk
of state managers, let alone of the state itself, exercising power is at best to
perpetrate a convenient fiction that masks a far more complex set of social
relations  that  extend  far  beyond  the  state  apparatus  and  its  distinctive
capacities.  Thus we  should always seek  to  trace  the circulation of  power
through wider and more complex sets  of  social  relations  both  within and
beyond the state. 
The notion of formal adequacy allows for substantive inadequacy. We can
take this further through the notion that form problematizes functionalism,
i.e., that the multiplicity of different forms creates problems about structural
15 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 137.
16 Joseph, ‘Restating’, p. 136.
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coherence because of their association with different institutional logics and
rationales for action. This opens the space for failure and calls for careful
attention to  the practices  that  seek to  overcome this  risk.  We could  even
describe this, half-seriously, as a ‘dysfunctionalist’ rather than functionalist
position. It is certainly inconsistent with any attempt to treat the state as a
simple  instrument  or  functional  mechanism  for  reproducing  capitalist
relations  of  production.  Indeed,  it  suggests  that  the  typical  form  of  the
capitalist  state  actually  problematizes  its  overall  functionality for  capital
accumulation and political class domination. For the institutional separation
of the state from the market economy, a separation that is a necessary and
defining feature of capitalist societies, results in the dominance of different
(and potentially contradictory) institutional logics and modes of calculation in
the state and the economy. Thus there is no guarantee that political outcomes
will serve the needs of capital—even assuming that these could be objectively
identified  in  advance  in  sufficient  detail  to  provide  the  basis  for  a
capitalistically  rational  plan  of  state  action  and  inaction.  The  operational
autonomy of the state is a further massive complicating factor in this regard.
Indeed,  insofar as it  enables the state to  pursue the interests of capital  in
general at the expense of particular capitals, it also enables it to damage the
interests  of  capital  in  general  too.  Accordingly,  one  must investigate the
structurally  inscribed  strategic  selectivity  of  the  specific  state  forms and
political regimes; and move away from abstract, often essentialist theorization
towards more detailed accounts of the complex interplay of social struggles
and institutions. 
THE DANGERS OF STATE-CENTRISM 
Joseph and I agree that capital accumulation cannot be secured exclusively
through market  forces  and  factory  despotism and  also  depends  on  extra-
economic mechanisms. We also agree that one can assess institutions in terms
of their relative contribution to securing these conditions and that the state has
a  crucial  role  in  these  respects.  We  disagree  that  these  conditions  are
necessarily best secured under the leadership and direction of the state or, at
least,  about  the best  way to  formulate this  claim. Whilst  not  denying the
continued importance of the state to capital accumulation and social cohesion,
we should recognize that  the  state  system is  embedded  in  a  wider set  of
systems, institutional complexes, and ‘civil society’. And we should recognize
that the state is an active force in meta-governance as well as government,
with  a  key  role  in  modulating  the  mix  of  coordinating,  regulating,  and
normalizing practices that secure accumulation and cohesion. This is the force
of  Gramsci’s claims that  the state  in  its  integral  sense can be  defined as
‘political society + civil society’ and that state power involves ‘hegemony
armoured  by  coercion’.17 Joseph’s  book  and  his  response  to  my critique




combine arguments that switch between state-centrism and a more nuanced
analysis that locates the state and its practices into a more complex nexus of
institutions and practices. Sometimes he refers to the state as an actor and on
other occasions it is a strategic terrain for the implementation and facilitation
of  hegemonic  projects  that  become institutionally embedded  in  the  wider
society.  My  earlier  critique  may  have  over-reacted  to  his  less  nuanced
formulations and neglected the weight of the more sophisticated arguments
that he deploys. Certainly there is much more common ground in his response
to  this  critique  and  there  are  many points  therein  on  which  we agree—
especially  concerning  the  specificity  of  the  operational  autonomy  and
institutional configuration of the state as a terrain of political struggle. Joseph
argues  that  ‘the  state  is  a  strategic  terrain  for  the  unfolding of  political
hegemonic projects.  It is the site of political struggles and social cohesion.
These  two aspects  combine in that  the state  must try to  meet the general
interests  of  capital,  but  also  is  a  terrain  of  struggle  between  different
groups’.18
CONCLUSION
Joseph  did  not  respond  directly  or  indirectly  to  my  criticisms  of  his
interpretation of Gramsci’s account of hegemony and I have not responded
directly  to  his  criticisms  of  Poulantzas.  Nonetheless,  the  form-analytic,
strategic-relational  approach  sketched  above  is  inspired  by  Gramsci  and
Poulantzas  as  well  as  Marx  and  can  therefore  be  interpreted  as  a  re-
affirmation of  my views on  Gramsci and my commitment to  Poulantzas’s
later work on the state as a social relation. The only point to make here about
Poulantzas is that his relational approach does not focus one-sidedly on the
balance of class forces in struggle. It is just as concerned with the materiality
of the state apparatus and its embedding in the wider social formation. This
can  be  seen  at  various  levels  of  abstraction  from  the  basic  institutional
separation of the state and market economy, the quintessential role of the state
in the mental-manual division of labour, and the spatio-temporal matrices of
the nation-state through more detailed analyses of specific types of normal
state  (liberal,  interventionist,  authoritarian  statist)  and  specific  types  of
exceptional  regime  (military  dictatorships,  fascism,  bureaucratic
authoritarian, etc) and down to specific conjunctural analyses and moments of
crisis. At each step there are both structural and strategic moments. I regard
this  as  important  because  Poulantzas’s  approach  provides  the  basis  for  a
critical realist approach to the question of how capitalist social formations
come to be reproduced.
In sum, then, Joseph suggests that structural hegemony is the mechanism that
ensures that unity rather than a social void exists in modern societies and that
it does so by linking social structures and securing their compatibility so that
18 Joseph, Hegemony, p.186.
147
DEBATE: HEGEMONY
social  order  is  reproduced.  Where  social  disunity  (a  vacuum)  threatens,
hegemony rushes in to  fill it.  This argument is  only sustainable through a
minimal definition of society as one that does not collapse so that hegemony
must exist  in  some form provided  that  society  exists.  Following Gramsci
(among  others)  I  prefer  to  allow for  a  range  of  mechanisms that  might
produce greater or lesser degrees of structural coherence and social cohesion
and do so on a wider range of scales rather than at a ‘societal’ level. As noted
in my earlier critique, these mechanisms range from simple coercion through
force-fraud-corruption and passive revolution to inclusive hegemony. In line
with my earlier work, I would now add that we should not take society for
granted as the terrain or  object  of hegemonic or  other  ordering practices.
Thus, as I have argued in this response, we can put hegemony in its place by
examining  structural  coherence  and  social  cohesion  in  two  steps.  First,
relative order is introduced by establishing a spatio-temporal zone of relative
stability beyond which relative chaos exists; and, second, within this zone of
relative stability constituted by a spatio-temporal fix, we find not stasis but
continuing struggles, conflicts, rivalries, and so forth. To explain the relative
balance between coherence and chaos, we need to explore issues of the social
imaginary, the dialectic of structure and strategy, formal adequacy, spatio-
temporal fixes, and specific practices. Contrary to Joseph’s suggestion that
the  SRA is  irrelevant  to  deeper  structural  levels  as  opposed  to  strategic
interactions, the SRA can be applied at all levels of analysis. Indeed, given
the inherently contradictory nature of the basic forms of a capitalist social
formation, they must have both structural and strategic  moments.19 In  this
sense,  despite  continuing  disagreements,  we  agree  that  a  critical  realist
Marxism provides the best framework for exploring these issues further. 
19 B. Jessop, ‘Capitalism, the regulation approach, and critical realism’ in A. Brown,
S. Fleetwood and J. Roberts (eds)  Critical Realism and Marxism (London and New
York: Routledge, 2002), p.107.
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